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## **THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDIA: IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF UTTARAKHAND SEPARATE STATE MOVEMENT**

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### **Abstract**

In the mid-1960s there was something of a sea change' in India's political economy, marking a shift from what Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) have termed command to demand politics. One of the best studies of this widely recognized evolution is Atul Kohli's (1990) looking at of India's 'growing crisis of governability.

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Kohli refers to the growing damage that has emerged in the Indian polity since the mid-1960s, demonstrated in the lack of lasting coalitions, a rising political uselessness in dealing with essential problems, and an incapability to provide lodgings rising political disagreement (including regional demands) without resorting to power and aggression. These are argued to be the products of unrestrained politicization within both the state and civil society, which has resulted in the inability of the state to “concurrently endorse growth and to provide lodgings diverse interests” (Kohli, 1990:14).

Kohli said that the ancestry of India's governability problem is political rather than socio-economic, with a extremely dominant state attempting to deal with a poor economy and in the process becoming the object of strong political contest. He traces the achievement and domination of the Congress Party prior to the mid-1960s to its strong party organization (especially at the District level), its adaptive merits, and the optimistic position that contact to support resources played in construction electoral sustain (often organized through 'traditional' vote banks). Congress also benefited from the magnetic leadership of Nehru, from the status and legality it had won during the independence resist, from a lack of any valuable resistance, and from a positive global financial system that aided stable financial growth. But by the early on 1970s major changes were clearly under way, signaled by the refuse of India's institutions, and particularly the Congress Party.

Kohli connections this with Indira Gandhi's conclusion to rule and preserve power through populism( a method that, he suggests, was intrinsically destabilizing. Power became more and more intense in the person of Mrs. Gandhi and in the primacy of New Delhi over the States, for instance through the beginning of the process of direct selection from above rather than by election from below, and the steady interference in State politics. Though

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Kohli uses this familiar 'Nehru good/Indira bad' format in analyzing changes in the Indian polity, he avoids, as Corbridge (1995) notes, the temptation to stylize the different periods too personally.

Nehru could have enough money to keep a lighter hand on the reins throughout the period of Congress authority, but by the time Mrs. Gandhi came to authority, severe resistance had arisen at both the State and national level, and Kohli draws out some of the proceedings and processes of the 1960s and 1970s that encouraged Mrs. Gandhi's 'strategy' of personalized rule. The Indo-Chinese war in 1962 saw the Chinese cross the Indo-Tibet limit with impunity, badly quivering India's confidence in itself and in its Armed Forces. Nehru's death in 1964, calamitous monsoon failures between 1965 and 1967, and the suspension of planning from 1966 to 1969 added to the erosion of early post-Independence optimism.

The latter was part of a wider crisis in the Indian economy during Indira Gandhi's premiership, as it fell prey to some of the contradictions of a capital goods-based import substitution strategy. Suffocated by the mammoth bureaucracy that the complex planning and licensing system had engendered, the economy slowed down (Ahluwalia, 1985; Bhagwati, 1993; Lewis, 1995). The growing power of the dominant proprietary classes vis-à-vis the Central Government additionally impaired the economy's skill to purpose powerfully, as savings vital to sustain assets in manufacturing were suspended (Bardhan, 1984). Meanwhile the global economy was also in reduction following the 1973/4 and 1978/9 oil crises, compounding interior problems.

Proposed situation, Congress was gradually additionally forced to 'buy' votes with the acceptance of social programmes for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and through a variety of loans, concessions and profit for other social groups such as farmers and students. The costs of these programmes could only be met by shortfall financing, contributing to the growing fiscal disaster of the 1980s. This additionally politicized the local policies of New Delhi and of the State Governments, as dissimilar regions and communal groups competed for limited capital. Mrs. Gandhi tried to preserve her power by destabilizing hostile State governments and through an even more intense personalization of rule ('India is Indira and Indira is India' was a renowned slogan, coined in 1976 by the then Congress President, Dev Kanta Barooah). In an impression of rising suspicion, many Congress candidates were selected on the basis of their personal faithfulness, not their ability, political knowledge or ability, and Indira Gandhi more and more fell back on direct, populist campaigns, bypassing the mainly obsolete Congress organization.

Kohli asserts to the regular institutional rejection that marks Congress and the wider Indian polity, and the increasing mobilization of different social and economic groups, as well as the extreme local and racial activism of the 1980s and 1990s. Personally connected to this is one of the most essential political trends of the final twenty years - the development in the number and achievement of a variety of local parties taking power in individual States (or two or three at most) all over India (Datta, 1994). These parties do not, or cannot, practically seek to national power, but they have come to wield a more and more powerful position in the national polity in their location as allies of the well-built parties (Saez, 2002).

Yet, for some time in the early 1990s, it looked as if the Bharatiya Janata Party may break this trend. As the party-political appearance of the Hindu Right, the BJP practiced an extraordinary rise in sustain over the 1980s and 1990s, and it has emerged as the major single-party adversary to Congress and the other smaller 'secular' left division parties (Jaffrelot, 1993; Hansen, 1999).

Compared to the other chief parties it has a well-established interior structure through its hierarchy of local, State and national organizations, and not likewise many of its political opponents, the BJP appears expressive a powerful and logical dream of and for India, centering on the idea of Hindutva (a Hindu nation-state). The agreement of the Hindu body politic, and its masculine fierceness, have been signaled, for instance, in the extremely representative yatras or processions around India, and in the difficult of the nuclear bombs in Pokhran in 1998 (Van der Veer, 1994; Corbridge, 1999).

Other than several of factors have worked against the BJP's particular dream of national unity, and may well be significant in preventing the party from achieving undoubted political and ideological domination. These comprise the deep ancestry of secularism, and the left-wing and low caste repercussion that the BJP's rise to power has aggravated (Hassan, 1998; Lerche, 1998). The appearance and reinforcement of subordinate and Backward caste parties (especially in the north) over the 1990s, and the well-recorded rise of local parties all over India have improved political rivalry for the BJP, while though much low and diluted, the Congress Party is not yet spent, and at this time still forms the second main only party in Parliament. Another difficulty for the BJP is the cultural and spiritual variety within India.

The Hindu dream espoused by the BJP and its non-political connections does not just estrange many in the middle of the non-Hindu population (such as Christians, Jains, Sikhs, Muslims, animists and Buddhists, and debatably the Scheduled Castes, or former Untouchables), but even in the middle of Hindus it is frequently more regionally than nationally most important or good-looking (Manor, 1998; Chiriyankandath, 1998; Corbridge, 1999).

For these reasons, amongst others, even though the BJP's 1998 election campaign was marked by significantly more restraint than in 1991 and 1996, the party immobile only won 179 Parliamentary seats out of a total of 543. Because of these electoral weaknesses, by 1999 the BJP remained in the uncomfortable and unbalanced location of heading up a weak alliance government in coalition with a number of irritable and at times hazardously troublesome local parties (notably the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu under Jayalalitha). In the elections of September-October 1999 the BJP won more seats, but they remained susceptible to force from alliance partners, and overall the influence of local parties in national government is obvious.

It has been consequences in a state in which few seats either way can make a decision that rules in some of the States, and given the delicate balance in the Centre, may even be powerful in winning or behind Government. The violent following rivalry that this has engendered has, amongst other things, certain political parties to court several of populist lines in different States. This is particularly true of the BJP, as it has required restoring the fading sustain generated by the Ayodhya temple-mosque controversy (Hansen, 1999) with other issues, often inclined at the regional or State scale.

Regional movements may offer particularly good-looking mobilizations to sustain, given the obvious possible supporting pay-offs (in terms of MPs and State Governments) that would result from the creation of a new central unit. For example, in the 1998 general elections the BJP won 11 of the 14 Lok Sabha (national parliament) seats in the Jharkhand region; in Uttaranchal they won 4 out of 4 seats; and in Chhattisgarh they won 7 out of 11 seats.

Amongst other calculations of local interest, creating these areas as States would make stronger the BJP's hand against resistance parties in Parliament, as well as strengthen its position in relation to its difficult and hazardously influential political allies. It would, in theory, deliver them more State governments, and perhaps more MPs, as there are plans to amplify depiction in some the areas. However, sustained sustain for the BJP in these regions was, of course, by no means certain, and it was the possible for other parties to simmer the subject that appeared to force their sustain for the new States and struggle with the BJP over this subject. By the same token, the indecision as to who would reap the political prize for the new States is one reason, why the BJP Government exhausted some time prevaricating on translating their assure into action.

Not Just like this, the demand for divide Statehood never got distorted into an anti Centre or even anti-UP sentiments, thus never infuriating any response from any district.

The UP on October 2, 1994, rather aggravated understanding from among the people in the UP plains. This is rather strange nature of the movement that perhaps accounts for a rapid consensus on this demand. While most other such demands, including those of Vidarbha, Jharkhand, Telangana and Gorkhaland have been waiting for lack of sustain from the individual parent States of Maharashtra, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal in that order, the UP Vidhan Sabha has passed the resolutions demanding a divided State of Uttarakhand on numerous occasions.

Apart from the political compulsions of the State elite, it makes it necessary for us to go ahead of the look and appreciate the rather strange nature of this movement, which productively generated substantial political sustain from all lodgings, that too in a comparatively small expanse of time. It will thus be academically more productive if this is viewed as a particular case of a centripetalism movement aggressive to come to conditions with a regional feeling which is tattered among strong nationalist (Centralist) sentiments and existential realities of economic lack and managerial abandon in a large State.

What makes it even more attractive is the turning point that came in 1994 and gave an unusual fillip to an or else long status, inertly articulated require. Economic lack or administration or administrative abandon in a great State were the important and compulsory, but not the enough factors to turn the tables, until some other circumstances necessary for mobilization were met in the 1990s. It is in this context that the study aims to go beyond the worn-out references to such explanations as require for lesser States, economic deficiency, back wash consequence, growth syndrome, anti-reservationist sentiments etc., and look for some more reasonable immediate factors, if not explanations.

It is with this academic inquisitiveness that some of the following questions have been raised, discussed, and partially answered in this study. What are the factors, separately from the insight of relative socio-economic deprivation that are a must for the making of centrifugal forces in Indian national set up? In other words, while the economic feature

may comprise a enough state, what are the extra factors that include a enough state to allow the local forces to expressed and declare? Or otherwise, what are the factors accountable for the non-emergence of regionalism in the Hindi belt for a long time and its new look in Uttarakhand?

What has been the nature of political and para-political movements in the Uttarakhand region that have taken place prior to the current agitation for a separate hill state? What has been the nature of the demand for Uttarakhand State before the current agitation was launched in the mid-1994? What have been the nature and the socio-economic geneses of the present movement, and what have been the historical backgrounds? What are the exact factors that made it probable for the movement to presume important size in the latest past, in spite of the efforts of the leadership to expanse it from the unsurprising political parties? What has been the electoral fall out of the movement? What made a national normal party like the BJP electorally total the complaint as in fact exposed by the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha results in the region?

Is it fair to take for granted from the electoral data that the movement has been appropriated by the BJP even as the local party, the UKD has been totally marginalized and even humiliated at the polls? What made the agreement on a State probable, that too in such a short distance of time? This agreement was ordinary both within and outside the area. Which province is at the fringe, in other words, are these any communities or sub-regions, where the movement is weak or even non-existent? Does it appearance some resistance in some areas at least? What has been the attitude of the dalits, the tribes, and the outside settlers towards this local movement? Are these any local variations as one shift from Garhwal to Kumaon, to Jaunsar Bawar, and to the terai regions? At last, the movement led to the formation of any such thing as a local Uttarakhand identity?

The new States' demand again emerged as a major issue in India. In definite areas, often, even though not always, characterized by economic and/or social marginalization, and possessing a sense of geographical, cultural, educational and/or linguistic local individuality, the resist for a political voice and right of entry to the state has been channeled into the longing for a divided State within the Union of India. Thus, these trends can be set inside the politicization of society examined by Atul Kohli and many others, and the associated growth of social movements over the most recent twenty years or so.

These changes from below' are, of course, submissively spring up with 'changes from above and the broader trends inside India's political financial system in relation to interior limit changes have been the center of this study. This macro-political background is a key 'field of chance within which these non-secessionist local movements eloquent and must be unspoken. In a polity in which the Central Government has complete Constitutional power over changes to federal limits (even if, hypothetically, the State Legislatures do not endorse the changes), the move in political approach in New Delhi is critical.

The discrimination between Nehru and Indira Gandhi's regimes in relation to local stress have been convincingly analyzed by Paul Brass (1994). He argues that while Nehru usually required distancing the Central Government from the local struggles in a variety of States, and arbitrating only in the last example, Indira Gandhi chose to interfere hazardously and at times subversively in local and other issues. This, Brass suggests, consequence in rising levels of resentment and aggression, and ironically, given Indira Gandhi's centralizing

desires, was linked with the rising uselessness of the Central Government in supervision conflicts.

As more local parties began to wear away Congress dominance in the States (and then at the Centre), Indira Gandhi's Government more and more lost the capability, over and above the desire, to work as impartially and 'above' State politics. Though we must be cautious not to sketch too bleak a split between the rules of father and daughter, an important characteristic of the last thirty years of Indian politics has been the way in the Central Government into the hurly heavily built of State politics, and often in a poor position to discuss or manage the condition.

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